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Grounding Concepts: the Problem of Composition 
 
Abstract 
In a recent book C.S. Jenkins proposes a theory of arithmetical knowledge which reconciles 
realism about arithmetic with the a priori character of our knowledge of it. Her basic idea is 
that arithmetical concepts are grounded in experience and it is through experience that they 
are connected to reality. I argue that the account fails because Jenkins’s central concept, the 
concept for grounding, is inadequate. Grounding as she defines it does not suffice for realism, 
and by revising the definition we would abandon the idea that grounding is experiential. Her 
account falls prey to a problem of which Locke, whom she regards as a source of inspiration, 
was aware and which he avoided by choosing anti-realism about mathematics.  
 
In a recent book C.S. Jenkins (2008) puts forward a novel theory of arithmetical knowledge, 
which, she believes, may also be extended to other areas of a priori knowledge. I will argue 
that the account fails, because it ignores a problem of which Locke, acknowledged by Jenkins 
as a source of inspiration, was aware. I start with sketching Jenkins’s view, then I explain 
what is wrong with it, and finally I show how Locke avoided the problem. 
 
1. Grounding concepts 
Approaches to a priori knowledge fall into three major groups. There is the unabashedly 
rationalist approach advocated by BonJour (1998) which seeks to revive something like the 
Cartesian idea of rational insight. At the other extreme we have Quine’s radical empiricism 
which denies the existence of a priori knowledge. In the middle there are views like 
Boghossian’s (1996), Peacocke’s (2000) and Bealer’s (2000),  which accept a priori 
knowledge but reject rational insight. It is this third position which Jenkins favours. The 
common ground between the various versions of this moderate view is the conviction that the 
evidence for propositions known a priori is somehow extracted from the concepts they 
contain. For instance, if you possess the concepts 7, 5, 12, +, and =, you have everything 
needed to justify that 7+5=12.
1
 Since the justification does not appeal to direct perceptual 
experience or to propositions which are themselves justified eventually by direct perceptual 
experience, the evidence for this proposition is a priori. 
                                               
1 Concepts, propositions and Lockean ideas are marked by italics. 
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 Advocates of this concept-based view are also realists about propositions known a 
priori. They hold that these propositions are not about concepts, are not made true by facts 
about concepts, are not simply rules for the application of the concepts, etc. Just as the 
proposition that Paris is west of Frankfurt expresses a non-mental fact of geography, 7+5=12 
expresses a non-mental fact of arithmetic. It is at this point that Jenkins observes a major 
problem which advocates of this view either did not fully appreciate or did not provide a 
convincing solution to. If arithmetical facts are independent of the mind, how can we obtain 
knowledge about them by examining our concepts? If concepts are mental items but numbers 
are not, how could an investigation of the former give us access to the latter?
2
 Jenkins adopts 
the analogy of a map to elucidate the issue. By studying a map of Europe we gain evidence 
for the proposition that Paris is west of Frankfurt and thus find out about a non-mental fact. 
But surely not any map will do. Studying the map of Middle-earth does not provide evidence 
for and does not yield knowledge of non-mental facts concerning the location of the Shire and 
Mordor. Similarly, if we want to sustain that concepts provide all the evidence we need for 
knowledge of certain non-mental facts, like the facts of arithmetic, we have to specify what 
concepts can do the trick.  
 To see what we need Jenkins invites us once again to consider the case of maps. We 
may acquire knowledge of geographical facts by studying a map only if the following two 
conditions are satisfied. The map has to be accurate (or at least sufficiently accurate in those 
respects which are relevant for the proposition we claim to know), and its accuracy should not 
be a matter of coincidence. The second clause serves to ward off Gettier-cases like this one. 
Imagine that you want to get from one place in Moscow to another. You have a map given to 
you by a friend you have good reasons to trust and which he believes to be accurate. Suppose 
the map is indeed accurate, but this came about in a rather unusual way. It is an old map 
dating back to the communist era, and it was designed to be misleading so as to conceal the 
location of a factory producing ammunition. However, the fall of communism and two 
decades of urban development have transformed the city and, strangely enough, the changes 
have rendered the map accurate. Under these circumstances we would deny that studying the 
map generates knowledge. 
 Similarly, when it comes to a priori knowledge we need concepts which are 
(relevantly) accurate in a non-accidental way. Concepts which meet this requirement are 
                                               
2 Jenkins takes concepts to be mental representations. For those who regard concepts as abstract entities the 
problem emerges in a slightly different form: how could the investigation of abstract entities of one sort 
(concepts of numbers) yield knowledge of abstract entities of a different sort (numbers)? 
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called grounded. The notion of grounding is supposed to explain how propositions known a 
priori can describe non-mental facts in the following way. Concepts which are grounded hook 
up to certain features in the real world.
3
 Thus propositions made up of concepts which are 
grounded make claims about how these features relate to one another, and if they are true, 
they express non-mental facts concerning these features. 
 Jenkins believes that concepts must be grounded in experience, and it is not difficult to 
see why. Lacking Cartesian-style rational insight we only have cognitive access to reality 
through the senses, therefore, if concepts are connected to features in the real world, that 
connection is mediated by the senses. The various features in the real world are manifested in 
the unconceptualized sensory input we receive, and concepts are grounded by being linked to 
the unconceptualized sensory input, which is connected reality. The link to sensory input may 
be direct or indirect. Certain concepts, which Jenkins sometimes calls basic, are anchored 
directly in the sensory input, whereas other concepts are composed of concepts which are so 
anchored. Composition, i.e. introduction of concepts in terms of other concepts in a legitimate 
way, preserves the connection to reality.  
 This account is avowedly Lockean (Jenkins 2008: xii, 126, 196–197). Locke believed 
that some ideas, the simple ideas, are received directly from experience, and the other ones, 
the complex ideas, are manufactured out of the simple ideas. Thus the idea of gold, which is 
made up of simple ideas like yellow, heavy and malleable, is connected to experience by way 
of the simple ideas of which it is composed.  
 To carry out this Lockean project one has to identify the class of basic concepts and 
spell out how they are grounded directly in experience. What makes this difficult is that 
arithmetical concepts, in contrast with clearly empirical ones, are not tied to some 
characteristic range of experience. Jenkins is very much aware of this problem but does not 
provide anything like a detailed solution. This should not be regarded as an omission which 
necessarily undercuts the viability of her approach, because the solution cannot be worked out 
without presupposing some particular view on the ontology of arithmetic and Jenkins wants to 
remain neutral on the issue of what features of reality arithmetical concepts correspond to. I 
allow that this problem does not cause insurmountable difficulties. But there is also a second 
problem, the problem of composition as I will call it, which consists in showing how 
grounding is transmitted from basic concepts to ones which are not directly grounded. Jenkins 
                                               
3 The features may be objects, properties or structures. Jenkins favors a structuralist account about the ontology 
of arithmetic (2008: 158, 162, 216), but does not regard this preference as part of her theory of grounding. The 
theory can be adopted by proponents of other views as well as long as those views are realist. 
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does not notice this problem and takes it for granted that concepts composed of grounded 
concepts are also grounded. I will argue, however, that this problem poses a serious challenge. 
 
2.  The problem of composition 
Grounding is non-accidental accuracy, but the notion of accuracy has not been 
explained so far. Accuracy is introduced through a chain of definitions, which I reproduce 
without the explanatory remarks. 
 
(1) I shall say that a concept refers iff it is a representation of some real feature of the 
world.  
(2) Correct composition of concepts means composition that, nonaccidentally, does not 
smuggle in extra content. 
(3) Fitting concepts are concepts which either refer themselves or else are correct 
compounds of referring concepts. 
(4) Given some purported a priori knowable proposition p, we can say that a concept C is 
relevantly accurate (or, sometimes, just accurate) iff C is fitting and neither C nor any 
concept from which C is composed misrepresents its referent in any respect relevant to 
our purported a priori way of knowing that p.
 
(Jenkins 2008: 126–128) 
 
To see how this works, let us assume that the basic concepts of arithmetic are those of 
elementary arithmetic and that the concept prime is not basic and should not to be reckoned 
among the referring concepts. However, its definition as number which is only divisible by 1 
and itself makes it a correct composition. So it is fitting according to the second clause of (3). 
It does not misrepresent its referent in any way that would matter to a priori knowledge of the 
theorems about prime numbers, so it is also accurate. 
 The problem is that this chain of definitions does not preserve the sort of link to reality 
which is needed in order to construe a priori knowledge in a realist fashion. Referring 
concepts do have the right sort of link to reality because they stand for real features. As long 
as we use only referring concepts, our propositions concern the real world. But when we start 
composing new concepts this link may well be lost. We may compose a definition of 
pelephant (pink elephant) and belephant (blue elephant) using only referring concepts. These 
concepts would then also be fitting. They do not misrepresent pelephants and belephants in 
any way that would matter for knowledge of the proposition that belephants are darker than 
pelephants. So these concepts are relevantly accurate with respect to that proposition. If the 
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requirement of non-accidentality is also met, these concepts are also grounded. Consequently, 
grounding defined in this way does not provide the required link to reality, for we certainly do 
not want to allow that propositions such as belephants are darker than pelephants express 
non-mental facts. Real life examples are provided by theoretical concepts of superseded 
scientific theories, e.g. the theory of luminiferous aether. The concepts in terms of which 
aether was introduced are still used in physical theory, so we have every reason to believe 
them to be grounded. The concept was introduced in the same way in which theoretical 
concepts are usually introduced, in order to explain certain facts. We should not doubt that the 
way theoretical concepts are usually introduced is legitimate, so aether is a correct 
composition; therefore, it is fitting as well. It is also relevantly accurate with respect to the 
proposition that aether transmits light waves. Since there was nothing accidental about the 
introduction of aether, the concept is grounded. Nevertheless, we would definitely deny a 
realistic understanding of propositions concerning aether. 
 There is a point where Jenkins seems to realize this difficulty and attempt to dissolve 
it. 
 
It may appear to be a mistake to assume that examining mere compounds of non-accidentally 
referring concepts will tell us anything about the world. They do not correspond to features of 
the world, so what could they be telling us about? Well, first, note that there is an important 
difference between a concept whose ultimate constituents non-accidentally refer and one 
whose do not. Remember that the aim is to explain how concepts can be treated as maps of 
the world rather than works of art. If the ultimate constituents of a concept non-accidentally 
refer, then that concept cannot be a work of art all the way down. It can, at most, be 
something we have created from previously existing map-like pieces. And if it is created from 
map-like pieces in the right way, then information about the world will be recoverable from it. 
For instance, when I examine my concept of triangular circle, I can learn something about 
those features of the world which correspond to its referring ultimate constituents (as it might 
be, the worldly properties of triangularity and circularity). So even if the compound concept 
does not itself refer to any genuine property, I can learn something about genuine properties 
by examining it. (Jenkins 2008: 126–128) 
 
This response is not satisfying for two reasons. First, non-referring compounds are not 
necessary to learn about the items which their ultimate constituents refer to. What could we 
discover through scrutinizing triangular circle that we cannot discover by scrutinizing 
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triangular and circle? Similarly, we do not need concepts like pelephant and belephant to 
learn about pink and blue. It might indeed happen that we somehow fail to detect certain 
features of the ultimate constituents and we only notice them when we examine the 
compound, e.g. when one only comes to reflect on the relative darkness of pink and blue by 
thinking about pelephant and belephant, but such cases do not provide much of a reason to 
study non-referring compounds. Moreover, this kind of usefulness of non-referring 
compounds does not require that non-referring compounds be grounded. Suppose I entertain a 
non-referring compound which is ungrounded because its accuracy is due to some Gettier-
style coincidence, and I grasp certain features of its constituents which I failed to grasp 
earlier. If the constituents are grounded, it does not matter that the compound which happened 
to facilitate the insight is not grounded. 
 Second, the worry Jenkins seeks to dispel is not the one which has been raised, 
because that worry concerns realism. The difficulty is that the definition of grounding does 
not discriminate between claims concerning pelephants and aether on the one hand and 
arithmetical claims on the other hand. The concepts pelephant and aether are grounded, yet 
we are not willing to construe propositions involving them realistically. If we want to be 
realists about arithmetic we must insist that status of arithmetical propositions is significantly 
different from that of propositions involving pelephant and aether. Grounding as defined by 
Jenkins does secure some connection between concepts and reality, but not the right 
connection, because this connection is too weak to support realism. 
 Let us see more closely what is missing. Jenkins understands by mathematical realism 
commitment to the mind-independence of mathematics rather than commitment to the 
existence of “distinctively mathematical objects” (Jenkins 2008: 13–14). This sort of realism 
is compatible with an ontology which accepts only ordinary objects like electrons and people 
but does not accept mathematical objects conceived as distinct from ordinary objects. It does 
not demand a special field of entities in the way in which biology demands living things. It 
insists merely that mathematics has nothing to do with the mental in the same sense in which 
physics has nothing to with the mental. The items which are claimed to be independent may 
be identified with mathematical truths, facts or state of affairs, but Jenkins is not interested in 
the respective merits of these formulations. She is only interested in the characterization of the 
independence, and the formulation she recommends is this: „p’s being the case is independent 
of our mental lives iff it is no part of what it is for p to be the case that our mental lives be a 
certain way” (Jenkins 2008: 17). Whereas this characterization is sufficient to mark off the 
sort of realism she favours from anti-realist alternatives, it does not fully capture what we 
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mean by realism. If we understand belephants are darker than pelephants as we should, as a 
universally quantified conditional, it is no part of this to be the case that our mental lives be a 
certain way. Belephants and pelephants are independent of the mental in the required sense, 
yet we are not realist about them. An empty universe would make the universally quantified 
propositions of physics vacuously true and its existentially quantified propositions false but 
would not licence realism about physics. Mind-independence is not enough: realism assumes 
ontological arrangements in virtue of which propositions of a certain kind are true or false 
other than the mere non-existence of the items the propositions purport to describe. We may 
call this the existential requirement of realism. It demands that there must be some entities 
whose nature and relations determines what propositions in a given field are true and false. 
One may be a realist about a field without endorsing one particular ontology. In fact, realists 
may disagree as to what the ontology of the given field is. So a mathematical realist like 
Jenkins does not have to commit herself to the ontology of “distinctively mathematical 
objects”. (A realist about economics would certainly deny that the there are economic objects 
like GDP and average income, which are distinct from people producing things, buying, 
selling, etc.) However, she must require that there are items which make it the case that 
2+2=4 but do not make it the case that 2+2=5, even though she may allow that those items are 
not numbers as ordinarily conceived. 
 What is missing from Jenkins’s approach is the guarantee that the existential 
requirement of realism is fulfilled. As long as arithmetic applies only basic concepts, i.e. 
concepts which refer, the existential requirement is satisfied and realism is warranted. But 
once we venture outside this part of arithmetic and start composing new arithmetical 
concepts, it might happen that at some point we cease to meet the existential requirement and 
lose our licence to realism. My examples work in the following way. In the case of pelephant 
and aether we understand well enough what sort of ontological arrangements are necessary to 
warrant realism about their constituents (the existence of elephants and the property pink, the 
existence of space, light, rigidity, diffraction, etc.) and we also understand what ontological 
arrangements are necessary to warrant realism about the compound (there must be elephants 
which are pink and there must be a substance which is sufficiently similar to how aether was 
described in 19
th
 century physics). The definition of grounding as it stands allows for the 
possibility that only the constituents of a grounded concept satisfy the existential requirement 
of realism but the compound concept does not.  
 Is there a way to answer this objection while preserving Jenkins’s original definition? 
One thing we may try is to impose tighter constraints on correct composition which would 
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render pelephant and aether incorrect compositions and thereby inaccurate. But this route 
seems hopeless, since these concepts are composed in ways which we ordinarily regard as 
legitimate, and a measure that would make them inaccurate would make many (most?) of our 
composite concepts inaccurate. A second possibility would be to suggest that the concepts 
used in the examples are accurate but not grounded, because their accuracy is merely 
accidental. However, it is not at all easy to see how the accuracy of pelephant and the like in 
the sense of (1)-(4) could be the result of sheer coincidence, and even if one can construct a 
scenario in which the accuracy of such concepts is due to some Gettier-style coincidence, we 
may take another scenario in which no such coincidence happens. To disqualify such concepts 
one would need a general argument to show that none of them meets the requirement of non-
accidentality. It is hard imagine how such an argument would proceed without also rendering 
the accuracy of compound arithmetical concepts accidental. The third option would be to give 
an argument to the effect that arithmetical concepts have some special feature which sets them 
apart from clearly empirical concepts such that in virtue of that feature they never fail to meet 
the existential requirement as a result of composition; i.e. there is something about them 
which guarantees that they always retain the connection to reality no matter how compounded 
they get. An argument of this kind has to respect two conditions. First, it should be 
independently plausible that the feature which makes arithmetical concepts special is relevant 
to the connection to reality. Second, it should not be biased in favour of arithmetical concepts 
and set lower requirements for them than for other concepts; e.g. when it comes to arithmetic, 
it should not reinterpret existence as mere possibility. Even though it cannot be ruled out that 
an argument of this kind might be proposed, at the moment it seems unclear how it would go. 
 Can we change the definition in a way that blocks the objection? We might consider 
getting rid of the problem of composition by getting rid of composition. We could then scrap 
(2) and (3) of the definition, and define accuracy by (1) and a slightly modified version of (4) 
which does not mention composition.
4
 In this way all grounded concepts would be referential, 
and since reference is sufficient to ensure the satisfaction of the existential requirement of 
realism, we would not have to worry about the requirement. But the idea of composition was 
introduced for good reasons, and abandoning it would make the theory of grounding doubly 
implausible. First, it would raise a difficulty similar to the usual objection against identifying 
mathematical objects with something physical: the world is not sufficiently rich to match the 
                                               
4 Like this: given some purported a priori knowable proposition p, we can say that a concept C is relevantly 
accurate iff C refers and it does not misrepresent its referent in any respect relevant to our purported a priori way 
of knowing that p. 
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richness of mathematics. Mathematics describes several structures which do not have models 
in the physical world. There is set theory with the transfinite numbers, but even in higher 
arithmetic we are sure to find structures which are too complex to be instantiated in the 
physical world. The idea of composition enables one to sidestep this difficulty and maintain 
realism even if the world is not rich enough to provide referents for all mathematical 
concepts. Second, giving up the notion of composition also poses a threat for the idea that 
arithmetical concepts hook up to reality through experience because it seems highly 
implausible that all arithmetical concepts are grounded directly in experience. It is hard to 
conceive how we might obtain even the fairly simple concept prime straight from experience, 
not to mention the concepts in advanced arithmetic. In the Preface of her book Jenkins 
describes her theory as an attempt to reconcile three pre-theoretic intuitions: that arithmetic is 
a priori; that it is to be interpreted realistically; and that empiricism is correct, i.e. all 
knowledge of the independent world comes through the senses. (Jenkins 2008: X) 
Composition is crucially needed to preserve two of these intuitions, realism and empiricism, 
so it cannot be simply abandoned. 
 Finally, there is a possibly less radical measure which consists in redefining correct 
composition as an externalist notion in the epistemological sense. As Jenkins emphasizes, 
grounding is an externalist notion; whether a concept is grounded depends on external facts, 
which are not accessible to the thinker through reflection. (Remember the case of a map: not 
even the most detailed examination of a map will reveal whether it is accurate.) In the original 
definition the externalist character of the notion is secured by including the notion of 
reference in its definition: a concept is grounded if it itself referential or has at least referential 
part, and being referential is a property of concepts which is not accessible to reflection. We 
might decide to transform correct composition into an externalist notion so that it should 
come to stand for a feature the possession of which cannot be determined solely by inspecting 
the composite concept and its parts. We could then, perhaps, argue that belephants and like 
may have the look of being correctly composed but there are also external constraints on 
correct composition and it is these external constraints which they fail to satisfy. I cannot rule 
out in advance that this solution might succeed, but I would like to point out two difficulties.  
First, it is not enough to say that there are external constraints on correct composition, 
one should also indicate how they should be conceived. If these constrains are not elucidated, 
the notion of correct composition would merely stand for some unspecified feature which 
makes non-referential concepts consisting of referential parts grounded. But this would leave 
the notion completely obscure, since one cannot appeal to the notion of grounding in the 
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clarification of correct composition because grounding is supposed to defined in terms of 
correct composition, not the other way around. What makes the elucidation a daunting task is 
that given Jenkins’s explanation one cannot see how external constraints might enter. A 
concept is said to be correctly composed if it does not introduce extra content, for instance 
small red circle is not a correct composition of red and circle (Jenkins 2008: 127). However, 
in the examples I gave one cannot see what the extra content is that might render their 
composition incorrect and one can see even less what the extra content would have to do with 
external constraints.  
 Second, even if the attempted externalist revision of the notion of correct composition 
succeeds, the theory of grounding might easily lose an advantage it has over Quine’s account. 
Like Quine, Jenkins is attracted to the idea that arithmetical concepts earn their keep by being 
indispensable to our overall account of experience. But she, like many other philosophers of 
mathematics, is worried that by linking the justification of arithmetic directly to 
indispensability Quine renders much of arithmetic unjustified. After all, many parts of 
arithmetic have no application in the empirical sciences; the theory of primes can again serve 
an example (if disregard its recent use in cryptography). In his more liberal mood Quine 
allows that even these parts have meaning in virtue of sharing the vocabulary and grammar of 
the parts which are indispensable, so sentences belonging there can also be true and false, yet, 
being isolated from experience, we have knowledge of them (Quine 1990: 94–95).5 Jenkins, 
on the other hand, may say that if the concepts specific to these parts of mathematics are 
grounded, and the theorems couched in terms of these concepts can be proven, we have all the 
evidence we need, so the theorems pass muster and count as knowledge (Jenkins 2008: 116, 
152–153). She then goes on to argue that we have evidence for the claim that the basic 
concepts of arithmetic are grounded, and the evidence is that that these basic concepts are 
indispensable to empirical science.
6
 Since according to the definition of grounding (non-
accidentally) correct compositions of grounded concepts are also grounded, the evidence for 
the existence of grounding for basic concepts is also evidence for the existence of grounding 
for the concepts which are correctly composed of basic ones. If, however, the notion of 
correct composition came to be understood in an externalist way, the evidence for the 
                                               
5 Quine is worried about higher set theory rather than arithmetic. For an argument that the theory of grounding 
cannot be extend to set theory see Rowland (2010). 
6 Jenkins’s account is slightly more complex, since in addition to grounding she also uses the notion of 
justification. A concept is justified if it is rationally respectable to rely upon as an accurate representation of the 
independent world (Jenkins 2008: 145). If a concept is justified but its accuracy is due merely to some lucky 
coincidence (as is the case with the accidentally correct map of Moscow in the first section) then it is not 
grounded. What indispensability provides evidence for is justification rather than grounding.   
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grounding of basic concepts would not automatically extend to non-basic ones, because we 
could not tell whether a concept is a correct composition by simply examining it and the 
concepts of which it is composed. Indispensability would then provide evidence only for the 
grounding of basic concepts, and when it comes to non-basic concepts which are not 
indispensable we would need evidence that they are correct compositions. If we cannot find 
such evidence, the theory of grounding faces a difficulty very much like the one Quine’s 
account faces. In Quine’s view the dispensable part of arithmetic is not knowledge, on the 
basis of the theory of grounding it might be knowledge but we do not have evidence that it is. 
So the externalist notion of correct composition should be elucidated in way which makes it 
possible to avoid this unwelcome consequence. 
 This discussion of the problem of composition does not show that the theory of 
grounding is beyond repair but it does show that the remedy might not be easy to find. 
 
3. Locke’s way out 
Since Jenkins names Locke as a precursor of her own approach, it might be worth seeing how 
Locke avoided this difficulty. Locke distinguished between knowledge and opinion. He 
described the knowledge of universal propositions in a way that is very similar to Jenkins’s 
account of a priori knowledge. Such knowledge can be attained only through the 
contemplation of abstract ideas, by seeing whether they agree or disagree (Locke 1975: 
IV.6.16.).
7
 But then he needs to face the following objection. We do see that the idea of harpy 
and the idea of centaur disagree, just as we see that the idea of square and the idea of circle 
disagree. So how come we are not willing to consider the knowledge that a harpy is not a 
centaur just as valuable as the knowledge that a square is not a circle? Notice the similarity to 
our own case: how come we are not willing to allow the same status to propositions about 
pelephants and aether as to theorems concerning primes? 
 And here is Locke’s answer: the propositions about centaurs do not provide “real 
knowledge” as opposed to the propositions about circles, because the idea of circle is real, but 
the idea of centaur is not. This might seem worrying because it may well be the case that no 
genuine circle exists. But Locke is not finished yet. He defines the reality of ideas in terms of 
conformity with the archetype, where the archetype is what the idea is supposed to correspond 
                                               
7 I refer to Locke’s work by the number of the book, the chapter and the paragraph. In what follows I will refrain 
from giving references as there should be too many, but the relevant passages are IV.iii.1–13. The examples I 
give come from Locke. The reality of ideas is also discussed in II.xxx.1–5., where Locke uses a slightly different 




to.  And now we reach the crux of the matter. The idea of centaur is an idea of substance 
whereas the idea of circle is an idea of mode. The different kinds of ideas have different 
archetypes. The archetypes of ideas of substances are things in the external world, i.e. patterns 
of coinstantiated properties. The idea of centaur does not correspond to any existing pattern, 
so it is not real, which renders propositions about centaurs unreal and devoid of value. The 
archetypes of ideas of modes are not external things, but they themselves, the very ideas. The 
idea of circle certainly corresponds to itself, it is, therefore, real, so mathematical knowledge 
is real knowledge. Locke also makes it very clear that mathematical knowledge does not 
require the existence of mathematical objects.
8
 
 This position would be unacceptable to Jenkins, because we would not recognize it as 
a realist interpretation of mathematics. Locke believes that mathematics is not concerned with 
what exists, it is concerned with our ideas, and the reason why we do not blame 
mathematicians for failing to describe existing things is that we do not even expect them to do 
that.
9
 Not being a realist about mathematics, he does not have to maintain that the connection 
with the real world established at the level of simple ideas persists through composition. Since 
complex ideas sometimes do not correspond to anything in the real world, he does not have to 
worry about harpies and centaurs. Jenkins, however, has to insist that composition preserves 
the connection to reality, because this is the way in which she hopes to secure a realist 
interpretation for arithmetical constructions which do not have an experiential basis of their 
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